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I Introduction 
This is a paper about protecting vulnerable consumers from over-indebtedness. The first 
part of this paper will outline what is meant by vulnerable consumers, over-indebtedness, 
and why these are the key concepts that this paper is framed around. As this paper is 
predicated on an assumption that vulnerable consumers ought to be protected from over-
indebtedness, the second part of this paper defends that assumption. The third part of this 
paper is an exploration of three of the main causes of over-indebtedness, and which 
causes ought to be the ones that are targeted to help prevent the over-indebtedness of 
vulnerable people. The fourth part of this paper briefly outlines ways that the systemic 
problems that can cause over-indebtedness can be addressed. This paper argues that 
government subsidised low-cost loans, or cash grants, for people who are over-indebted 
due to vulnerability are an appropriate direction for further research that may be more 
welfare enhancing than other ways to address over-indebtedness caused by vulnerability. 
 
II Focussing on Vulnerable Consumers and Over-Indebtedness 
 
A Introduction 
The first part of this paper focuses on vulnerable consumers and over-indebtedness. The 
paper is framed in these terms because consumers who are acting from a position of 
vulnerability should be protected from the amoral machinations of the open market. The 
same reasoning that makes general consumer protection appropriate, make extra 
protection for vulnerable consumers also appropriate.
1
 This paper will outline the ways 
that consumers can be vulnerable, and how vulnerability can be considered a transitional 
state rather than a permanent class.  
 
This paper is framed in terms of preventing over-indebtedness because consumer credit 
decisions can have significant long term effects of the quality of life of the consumers, 
and over-indebtedness can have a severely negative welfare impact on consumers.
2
 In the 
discussion about over-indebtedness there will be an abstract discussion of why over-
indebtedness is bad for consumers, and then an example using New Zealand based data to 
contextualise the problem.  
  
1
 Peter Cartwright “Understanding and Protecting Vulnerable Financial Consumers” (2014) 38 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 119. 
2
 Therese Wilson “Responsible Lending or Restrictive Lending Practices? Balancing Concerns Regarding 
Over-Indebtedness with Addressing Financial Exclusion” in Michelle Kelly-Louw, et al. The Future of 
Consumer Credit Regulation: Creative Approaches to Emerging Problems (Ashgate, Hampshire, 2008) 91 
at 100. (Wilson) 
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B Vulnerable Consumers 
 
1 Introduction 
Vulnerability is a particularly important concept in relation to consumer credit products 
because the products can be long term contracts for service, with a total cost that is often 
not clearly defined at the outset.
3
 This means that the effects of a poor decision made in a 
moment of vulnerability can endure for a very long time. Cartwright
4
 proposes that there 
are five ways that consumers can be vulnerable. These are informational, supply, 
pressure, redress, and impact vulnerabilities.
5
  
 
2 Informational Vulnerability 
Informational vulnerability arises when a consumer does not have the ability to 
understand the information relevant to making a good decision about consumer credit.
6
 
For example, they may not be able to read, may not understand key concepts like 
compound interest, or may not be able to critically evaluate claims made in advertising.
7
 
There tends to be a focus in literature on informational vulnerability, probably because it 
is also the least problematic in terms of compatibility with a free market 
conceptualisation of consumer credit agreements. A consumer acting under an 
informational vulnerability is not acting “…with perfect information…to make ‘perfect,’ 
rational choices thus enhancing the efficiency of the market.”8  
 
The antidote to this vulnerability is also the education and “responsibilisation”9 of the 
consumer, pushing the responsibility for making perfect and rational choices
10
 back on to 
the credit consumer. However there is a lack of empirical evidence that financial 
education has an “emancipatory”11 effect on vulnerable consumers, probably because 
consumer credit products change frequently, are very complex.
12
 Focussing on 
  
3
 Richard Tooth “Behavioural Economics and the Regulation of Consumer Credit” (2012) New Zealand 
Law Foundation and Sapere Reseach Group at 3. 
4
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 119. 
5
Cartwright, above n 1, at 121. 
6
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 121. 
7
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 122. 
8
 Therese Wilson, Nicola Howell, and Genevieve Sheehan “Protecting the Most Vulnerable in Consumer 
Credit Transactions” (2009) 32 Journal of Consumer Policy 117 at 121. (Wilson et al.) 
9
 Wilson et al., above n 8, at 121. 
10
 Wilson et al., above n 8, at 121. 
11
 Donncha Marron “Governing Poverty in a Neoliberal Age: New Labour and the Case of Financial 
Exclusion” (2013) 18 New Political Economy 785 at 800. 
12
 Marron, above n 11, at 800. 
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informational vulnerability as the critical element of vulnerability ignores the 
compounding effect of other vulnerabilities, such as supply vulnerability.  
 
3 Supply Vulnerability 
Supply vulnerability is when the credit consumer needs access to credit, and due to a 
limited supply of credit products available, they must take whatever consumer credit 
product is made available.
13
 This vulnerability is particularly relevant when the consumer 
needs credit to facilitate access to “…products essential to health and well-being such as 
energy, food, and health care”14 and it can lead to consumers accepting deals that “…can 
simply aggravate a bad cashflow situation, adding interest costs to an existing monthly 
shortfall.”15 It has been argued that “when hungry children are in the house”16 it can be 
difficult for human beings to act with full economic rationality.
17
 
 
4 Pressure Vulnerability 
Pressure vulnerability arises when there is a “power asymmetry”18 between a financial 
institution and a credit consumer where the credit consumer may feel inferior, powerless 
or intimidated and accept a disadvantageous deal because they do not feel entitled to, or 
are not able to, bargain with the financial institution.
19
 This does lead to a question of 
how, in a market situation, a line can be drawn between “exploitative and persuasive”20.  
 
5 Redress Vulnerability 
Redress vulnerability is when credit consumers do not know their rights, or do not have 
the tools or mechanisms to enforce their rights.
21
 Different types of vulnerability can 
compound on each other,
22
 for instance a consumer may feel inferior because they are 
behind on debt repayments, and so be unwilling to confront the financial institution when 
a penalty fee is mistakenly charged. 
 
  
13
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 123. 
14
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 123. 
15
 Alan M. White “Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons from Microcredit in Developing Nations” (2012) 
69 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1093 at 1108. 
16
 White, above n 15, at 1103. 
17
 White, above n 15, at 1102-1103. 
18
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 123. 
19
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 123. 
20
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 123. 
21
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 123-124. 
22
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 125. 
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6 Impact Vulnerability 
Impact vulnerability is when a consumer will “suffer more from making [poor] 
choices”.23 This vulnerability is linked to poverty, where the cost of a bad decision can 
impact a person living in poverty more adversely than it would a person not living in 
poverty.
24
 Australian research suggests that “the loss of wellbeing as a result of incorrect 
choice is proportionally greater for an income support recipient than it is for someone on 
an average wage.”25 For example, a $20 unarranged overdraft fee will impact a person 
who can only afford to spend $20 on food every week more adversely than it will impact 
a person who can afford to spend $200 on food every week.  
 
The way that the literature discusses impact vulnerability seems to tie the socioeconomic 
status of the consumer to their probability of vulnerability. While there is also research to 
suggest the “credit use and financial management were not easily linked to the 
participants levels of income, employment and education”26, it is arguably appropriate 
that socioeconomic status (under the guide of impact vulnerability) be included as a 
factor for consideration, as most of the other vulnerabilities will be magnified where the 
consumer is also in a low socioeconomic group: “…being poor and subject to stressful 
financial circumstances can cloud one’s judgement, making one far more receptive to 
disadvantageous business dealings.”27 
 
7 Permanent Class or Transitional Category 
There are many ways that a person can be vulnerable, and many people may transition in 
and out of vulnerability based on their characteristics at a certain moment.
28
 It has been 
argued that “many of us display elements of vulnerability in particular circumstances.”29 
However, drawing a circle around the entire population and declaring all consumers of 
credit vulnerable risks blurring the distinction between poor choices that are later 
regretted, and poor choices that were made because the consumer was vulnerable.
30
 
Recognising that “some circumstances that cause vulnerability are longstanding, [and] 
  
23
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 124. 
24
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 124. 
25
 Linda Brennan, Zuleyka Zevallos, and Wayne Binney “Vulnerable consumers and debt: Can social 
marketing assist?” (2011) 19 Australasian Marketing Journal 203 at 205. 
26
 Brennan, above n 25, at 205. 
27
 A Best When Consumers Complain (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981)at 28 as cited in 
Cartwright, above n 1, at 123 
28
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 121. 
29
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 121. 
30
 Tooth, above n 3, at 5. 
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others may arise extrinsically, almost overnight, and could affect anyone distinct from 
level of income or capability,”31 any proposed protections should be designed with the 
understanding that there is not a binary classification of vulnerability, but degrees of 
vulnerability, and should not unduly restrict the whole consumer credit market.  
 
Putting measures in place to protect all consumers as they transition in and out of 
vulnerability will, at the same time, “help protect the interests of a wide range of 
consumers”.32 The implementation challenge is then to acknowledge this general 
consumer vulnerability and make the consumer protections scalable to the degree of 
vulnerability in the specific consumer. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Conceptualising consumer vulnerability at the point of obtaining consumer credit 
products is a way to identify which consumers are deserving of extra protection. 
 
C Over-Indebtedness 
 
1 What is the Problem with Over-Indebtedness? 
Consumer credit is the mechanism through which financial institutions lend money to 
individuals to “…enable individuals to borrow to meet their immediate needs”33. In the 
context of this paper, consumer credit is “the supply of credit for which interest or a fee is 
payable”34 and is generally supplied in the form of “credit cards, personal loans, vehicle 
financing, hire purchase agreements, student loans and mortgages”.35  
 
Consumer credit also works as “as device to trade present consumption for future 
consumption”36 which means that money consumed before it is earned must eventually 
be repaid to the lending financial institution. For some people, particularly the people 
who must borrow to meet their day-to-day expenses, debts can be extremely difficult to 
repay. 
 
  
31
 Lorna Fox O’Mahony, et al. “Conceptualizing the Consumer of Financial Services: a New 
Approach?”(2015) 38 Journal of Consumer Policy 111 at 114. 
32
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 121. 
33
 Tooth, above n 3, at 2-3. 
34
 Tooth, above n 3, at 2. 
35
 Tooth, above n 3, at 3. 
36
 White, above n 12, at 1101. 
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In New Zealand there is currently a very high level of consumer debt. According to the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), the average household debt in New Zealand in 
1991 was 57% of nominal disposable income and in 2014 that percentage rose to 155%.
37
 
Research in Australia has suggested that “…mass consumption is now strongly linked to 
personal identity”38, that people who cannot immediately afford to buy everything that 
they think they need use debt to maintain their lifestyle
39
  and that “a significant cultural 
change seems to have taken place in the attitude of many Australians towards debt.”40 
The data about debt in New Zealand from the RBNZ appears to support a hypothesis that 
a similar change has happened in New Zealand.
41
 
 
The same RBNZ data set shows that the average percentage of nominal disposable 
income required to service the loans has not changed meaningfully over the same time 
period,
42
 probably because while interest rates remain low the cost of servicing those 
loans is also low.
43
 This means that while on average the total household debt in New 
Zealand has increased significantly, the average burden on households to repay it has not 
increased when expressed as a proportion of nominal disposable income.
44
  
 
When expressed as an average across the population the harm of consumer credit is 
difficult to see. The harm of consumer debt does not necessarily attach to the largest debt, 
or the debt most disproportional to the nominal disposable income of the household. This 
is because the way that people in low socioeconomic groups are expected to participate in 
financial life is different to how the middle class is expected to participate. The middle 
class is encouraged into a “risk-embracing ethic”45 of investing- leading to large debts for 
long term asset growth (like mortgages), where people in low socio-economic groups are 
“inducted into [the] more old-fashioned virtues of thrift and self-reliance”46  that lead to 
defensive financial behaviour and risk reduction.
47
 This means that much smaller debts 
  
37Reserve Bank of New Zealand “Household Debt” (21 September 2015) Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/key_graphs/household_debt/>  
38
 Brennan, above n 25, at 204. 
39
 Brennan, above n 25, at 204. 
40
 Brennan, above n 25, at 204. 
41
 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, above n 37. 
42
 In 1991, on average 8% of nominal disposable income was required to service household debt. Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand, above n 37. 
43
 Brennan, above n 25 
44
 Reserve Bank of New Zealand, above n 37. 
45
 Marron, above n 11, at 804. 
46
 Marron, above n 11, at 803. 
47
 Marron, above n 11, at 804. 
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become much bigger problems for people who are participating in financial life outside of 
“the cultural privileging of calculated risk taking”.48  
 
A way to conceptualise the populations that are being harmed by over-indebtedness is to 
look at the data reported by the New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services 
(NZFFBS). The NZFFBS records data about people who contact the NZFFBS and ask for 
help for managing their personal finances. In the 2014-2015 financial year 45,000 client 
families contacted the NZFFBS.
49
 Those families on average owed $25,500 with $3,700 
outstanding overdue payments when reaching the crisis that led them to seek help from 
the NZFFBS.
50
 In the 2014-2015 financial year those families seeking help were 
disproportionately social welfare beneficiaries (74%).
51
  
 
Social welfare beneficiaries in particular can find themselves “continu[ing] to get deeper 
into debt until the ‘debt cycle’ becomes a ‘debt trap’.”52 People in a ‘debt trap’ (or, ‘over-
indebted’53) can find themselves suffering from “…stress, depression, anxiety; become 
violent, suicidal, or homicidal; and face barriers to access to further credit and barriers to 
work.”54 For people caught in continuous debt, “[a]s the debt burden worsens, so too does 
a sense of helplessness for these welfare recipients.”55 Consumer credit is harmful when 
the disutility consequences outweigh the utility consequences of borrowing for the 
individual consumer.
56
 
This paper is going to proceed on the basis that consumer credit is harmful when it to 
causes a person to become “trapped into accumulating unaffordable debt”57 and is 
subjective to the characteristics of the consumer. For the purpose of this paper, when 
people are trapped in “accumulating unaffordable debt”58 they are over-indebted. 
  
48
 Marron, above n 11, at 802. 
49
 New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services “Annual Statistics Summary” (15 September 
2015) New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services <http://www.familybudgeting.org.nz/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/NZFFBS-statistics-to-June-20151.pdf> 
50
 New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services “Figures show budgeting is needed as much as 
ever” (15 September 2015) New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services 
<http://www.familybudgeting.org.nz/figures-show-budgeting-is-needed-as-much-as-ever/> 
51
 New Zealand Federation of Family Budgeting Services, above n 49. 
52
 Brennan, above n 25at 209. 
53
 White, above n 12, at 1109. 
54
 Wilson, above n 2, at 100. 
55
 Brennan, above n 25, at 209. 
56
 White, above n 12, at 1110. 
57
 Brennan, above n 25, at 205. 
58
 Brennan, above n 25, at 205. 
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2 Contextualising with Numbers 
A useful type of vulnerability for contextualising the issue is impact vulnerability. This is 
an indirect way of identifying people who are living in poverty, or who have low 
incomes, as being vulnerable.
59
 People on low incomes are also more likely to have 
limited access to “mainstream credit products”60 which can drive them to use consumer 
credit products that are less reputable and more expensive,
61
 and they also have less 
capacity to repay debt because they have less money to start with. 
 
This is a useful element to focus on because a low income can be objectively defined, 
which can give scale and context for conceptualising the issues being covered in this 
paper. For the purpose of this paper, a person on a low income will be any person earning 
less than the full time adult minimum wage in New Zealand. After 1 April 2015, that is 
$590 gross per week.
62
 This means that most social welfare beneficiaries are included in 
this range.
63
 This is adopted only as a guideline for reference in this paper because the 
interpretation of ‘low income’ can vary significantly between different countries. 
 
It is useful in this context to consider the data that is reported by the NZFFBS. The 
average total debt of families using their services was $25,500. If that debt was repaid 
that debt at a rate of 20% of gross income on the full-time minimum wage (i.e. repaid at 
$118 per week), with an interest rate of 13.95% per annum
64
 the debt would take at least 
six years to repay and would include $12,681 in interest charges.
65
 This assumes that 
80% of the minimum wage income would meet all of the living costs and unexpected 
expenses for those six years, and also assumes that the low income consumer has access 
to mainstream consumer credit products with reasonable interest rates.   
 
  
59
 Cartwright, above n 1, at 124. 
60
 Wilson, above n 2, at 92. 
61
 Wilson, above n 2, at 92. 
62
 New Zealand at Work “The Minimum Wage” (13 October 2015) Ministry of Business, Innovation & 
Employment <http://employment.govt.nz/er/pay/minimumwage/index.asp> based on 40 hours per week. 
63
 Work and Income “Home” (13 October 2015) Work and Income 
<http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/brochures/benefit-rates-april-2015.html> 
64
 Westpac New Zealand “Personal Loans Interest Rates & Fees” (13 October 2015) Westpac New Zealand 
Ltd. <http://www.westpac.co.nz/personal-loans/interest-rates-fees/> based on the lowest interest rate listed 
on 3 October 2015. 
65
 Sorted.Org “Debt Calculator” (13 October 2015) New Zealand Commission for Financial Capability 
<https://www.sorted.org.nz/calculators/debt> 
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D Conclusion 
This part of the paper has outlined and explained the concept of consumer vulnerability 
as a transitional state rather than a permanent class, and the ways that consumers can be 
vulnerable. Of particular interest is impact vulnerability, which appears to serve as an 
indirect way for consumers with low incomes to be vulnerable by definition. This paper 
then explained why over-indebtedness is a problem that vulnerable people should be 
protected from, and laid out an example of the finances of a person that is based on 
minimum wages, average rents and the average debt of people seeking budgeting help. 
This example was set out to contextualise the issue in New Zealand. The purpose of this 
section has been to outline the components of the issue that this paper will continue to 
explore. 
 
III The Problematic Idea of Protecting People from Debt 
 
A Introduction 
This part of the paper will address some of the assumptions that are embedded in the 
framing of this issue. The way that the thesis statement has been framed is that vulnerable 
people ought to be protected from over-indebtedness, and has directed the discussion 
away from considering whether vulnerable people ought to be protected from all 
indebtedness. It has also been framed in a way that assumes that debt is something that 
people sometimes need to be protected from, which is not philosophically consistent in a 
free market that is populated with rational consumers. There is also an embedded 
assumption that there are some people who lack the capacity to financially participate in a 
way that is fully cognisant of financial realities. These assumptions are defended in this 
part of the paper.  
 
B Access to Consumer Credit Products is Good for Consumers 
The conversation about people living on low incomes and harmful consumer credit 
products necessarily raises the question of whether, for people living on low incomes, 
there can be non-harmful consumer credit products.  
 
Access to mainstream consumer banking facilities helps people with low incomes to 
become “better subjects at managing their own poverty.”66 Access to consumer credit 
products enables people living on low incomes to smooth consumption over time,
67
 and 
research based on natural disaster recovery in the United States of America (USA) 
  
66
 Marron, above n 11, at 788. 
67
 White, above n 15, at 1106. 
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suggests that access to payday lending “help[s] alleviate problems for people in financial 
distress caused by a natural disaster.”68 Access to consumer credit can also enable people 
to dramatically improve their quality of life, for instance it can enable people who are 
otherwise financially dependent to leave abusive spouses and establish new independent 
lives.
69
 In some situations, access to consumer credit products can be welfare increasing. 
 
However, access to credit can also decrease welfare. As monthly shortfalls compound 
and interest costs must also be paid,
70
 it can become difficult to distinguish between using 
consumer credit facilities to smooth the cost of irregular consumption needs, and using 
them to forestall the effects of outright insufficiency of income to live. Research suggests 
that people who are trapped in a poverty cycle are generally over-indebted because of 
habitual shortfalls in routine household costs.
71
  
 
The effect of consumer credit products on welfare can be varied, however there are some 
benefits to it being available. There is also evidence that if there is to be access to 
consumer credit products, it can be welfare enhancing for people to have access to 
mainstream financial institutions
72
 as well as fringe financial institutions.
73
  The terms 
and products at fringe financial institutions are generally less favourable to borrowers
74
 
however there is evidence that mainstream financial institutions increasingly withdraw 
from low socioeconomic areas.
75
 This withdrawal has several drivers, including modern 
banking systems being more efficient at market segmentation and more able to isolate 
high risk communities,
76
 and that mainstream financial institutions do not want the 
reputational risk of lending to people with low incomes and subsequently being accused 
of engaging in irresponsible lending.
77
 For many people with low incomes, access to 
affordable consumer credit with low transactional costs could be the difference between 
smoothing consumption costs, and an incremental descent into a ‘debt trap’.78  
  
68
 Younghee Lim, Trey Bickham, Cassie M. Dinecole, Julia Broussard, Brittany E. Weber, Alethia Gregory 
“Payday Loan Use and Consumer Well-Being: What Consumers and Social Workers Need to Know about 
Payday Loans” (2014) 18 Journal of Poverty 379, at 390. 
69
 White, above n 15, at 1111. 
70
 White, above n 15, at 1108. 
71
 Marron, above n 11, at 800. 
72
 Marron, above n 11, at 789. 
73
 Lim, above n 68, at 392. 
74
 Lim, above n 68, at 382. 
75
 Marron, above n 11, at 789. 
76
 Marron, above n 11, at 789. 
77
 Wilson, above n 2, at 98. 
78
 Marron, above n 11, at 790. 
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Limiting access to mainstream consumer credit products can drive borrowers to fringe 
consumer credit products.
79
 By the same reasoning, limiting access to fringe consumer 
credit products can drive borrowers to other informal consumer credit products that are 
even more difficult to regulate, or to bankruptcy.
80
  
 
Access to credit can be welfare enhancing, but it can also be welfare decreasing and it 
depends on the situation. It is more likely to be welfare enhancing if it is from a 
mainstream financial institution, but credit from fringe financial institutions can also be 
welfare enhancing in some circumstances, and less welfare decreasing than informal and 
unregulated credit.  
 
C Rationality and Paternalism 
From a libertarian perspective the framing of this paper is objectionable, because there is 
an embedded assumption in this subject that there is such a thing as harmful consumer 
credit. When assessed through a utilitarian lens, there can be no harm in voluntary 
consumer credit agreements, because consumers are the people who are best placed to 
decide what products will best maximise their utility.
81
 As consumers choose to incur 
debt in order to receive access to money in advance, through the theory of revealed 
preference it must be assumed that those consumers chose debt, on whatever terms they 
agreed to, over not having access to the money in advance.
82
 Further, as consumers are 
best placed to know what products are best for them, regulators have no grounds to limit 
that credit seeking behaviour.
83
 
 
This argument has several issues, including that when consumers use credit, they are 
often not so much expressing a preference to go into debt, as they are expressing “their 
basic preference to eat.”84 Consumers also are not perfectly rational actors, and instead 
tend to be overly optimistic about their future ability to repay debt
85
 and also discount the 
preferences of their ‘future selves’ in favour of the preferences of their ‘current decision 
making selves’.86 This means that consumers are often not making rational decisions 
about their long term debt strategies, but are instead choosing the least-worst option 
  
79
 Wilson, above n 2, at 99. 
80
 Lim, above n 68, at 387. 
81
 White, above n 15, at 1100. 
82
 White, above n 15, at 1100. 
83
 White, above n 15, at 1100. 
84
 White, above n 15, at 1102. 
85
 White, above n 15, at 1103. 
86
 White, above n 15, at 1103. 
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available to satisfy current needs.
87
 There is also an effect that advertising has of 
distorting the true preferences of consumers.
88
  
 
This paper will continue on the basis that harmful consumer credit products can logically 
exist.  
 
D Patronising Vulnerable People 
However, the argument above about consumers sometimes not being rational actors is 
problematic because it relies on a view that people who have become over-indebted are 
not fully aware of what they are agreeing to, or the impact that their agreements will have 
on them in the future. A recurring characteristic referenced is that vulnerable people are 
not sophisticated consumers and lack knowledge about consumer credit products.
89
 This 
is problematic because it removes agency from vulnerable people and discounts the 
knowledge and experience that people vulnerable people do have.
90
 
 
It is arguable that many consumers are poorly educated about consumer credit products 
and this is not a characteristic unique to people who are vulnerable.
91
 Consumer credit 
products are complex, change often, and many laypeople have difficulty understanding 
them.
92
 While surveys focussed on people with low incomes report a general 
understanding of debt at a level of understanding an obligation to repay the money,
93
 it is 
probable that there are many people who understand their consumer credit debt with the 
same kind of depth.   
 
Similarly, it is probable that people vulnerable people do not need to be educated about 
the virtues of saving, as suggested by Brennan et al.
94
 The challenge is likely not that 
vulnerable people do not know that they should save money, or do not want to save 
money, but that the there is no money left to save. This is a relevant issue to this paper 
because it is convenient to identify individual characteristics of people caught in a ‘debt 
trap’ and use those characteristics to explain a problem, rather than look at structural 
  
87
 White, above n 15, at 1101-1105. 
88
 White, above n 15, at 1104. 
89
 Brennan, above n 25, at 205. 
90
 Marron, above n 11, at 804. 
91
 Tooth, above n 3, at 9-10. 
92
 Tooth, above n 3, at 9-10. 
93
 Brennan, above n 25, at 205. 
94
 Brennan, above n 25, at 205. 
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issues around class, gender and race.
95
 For instance, it is easier to identify people who 
have low literacy levels and attach their over-indebtedness to their inability to read the 
fine print of consumer credit contracts, than it is to consider that the systematic 
withdrawal of mainstream lending facilities from low income areas
96
 might be the 
primary issue. 
 
E Conclusion 
Arguments about access to some debt being beneficial, economic rationality, paternalism 
and disempowering people who are vulnerable are difficult to resolve because it very 
much depends on the circumstances of the person, and the use of credit. People who are 
in a ‘debt trap’ will sometimes be there because of a preference to receive necessary 
medical treatment and be in debt, while others will be there because of a preference to 
own a brand new car. This part of the paper has served to highlight some of the 
underlying tensions that need to be balanced when trying to identify which consumer 
credit decisions were made as a result of unacceptable consumer vulnerability and 
deserve state regulation, intervention or relief, and moving toward a way to protect 
vulnerable people from over-indebtedness. 
 
IV Causes Over-Indebtedness 
 
A Introduction 
 
This part of the paper will focus on what underlying issue is causing the symptoms 
described above. Access to credit is very important for financial participation in society.
97
 
Decisions about whether to access consumer credit products, what type of credit to use, 
and what types of goods or services to buy with consumer credit products, are decisions 
that most people make routinely. Consequently there are many and varied opinions about 
how debt ought to be used and managed that can range from pragmatism to moral 
judgement.
98
 In this part of the paper three competing causes of over-indebtedness are set 
out. The first is that over-indebtedness is caused by poor decision making about credit 
use.
99
 The second is that the imposition of objectively onerous terms is the cause of over-
indebtedness. The third is that over-indebtedness is a symptom of poverty. This paper 
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argues that all three of these causes contribute to over-indebtedness, however objectively 
onerous terms and underlying poverty are issues that can be systemically addressed. 
 
B Poor Decision Making at Point of Credit Use Causing Over-Indebtedness 
Consumer credit holds a conflicted place in society, all at the same time smart,
100
 
inevitable,
101
 everyday,
102
 dumb,
103
 avoidable
104
 and shameful,
105
 depending on the 
qualities of the observer,
106
 the qualities of the consumer,
107
 and the particular goods or 
services purchased with the consumer credit. It is tempting to the view the problem of 
harmful consumer credit as being primarily about what the credit is being spent on or 
what type of consumer credit product is being provided. However, putting limits on 
certain types of spending with credit, or putting limits on certain types of credit products 
available would require some framework for deciding what type of consumer credit 
spending is permissible. That framework could only be developed by privileging certain 
types of consumer credit spending over others. Any decision would be made reflecting 
the inherent cultural biases embedded in the categorisation of debt uses. A particular 
distinction appears to exist between incurring debt that is investing for the future, versus 
the paying for day-to-day needs.
108
 According to the New Zealand Commission for 
Financial Capability (NZCFC), speculating in the property market is ‘smart debt’ while 
borrowing to buy groceries is ‘dumb debt’.109  
 
Those recalling the sub-prime mortgage collapse of the early 2000’s110 or the 19% p.a. 
mortgage interest rates of the late 1980’s (compared to 7% p.a. in 2015)111 might be a 
little more reluctant to characterise mortgage debt so positively. Similarly a person who 
has no food may be reluctant to characterise debt to pay for groceries so negatively. A 
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different framework for assessment, for example prioritising ‘need’ purchases over 
‘want’ purchases, would yield an entirely different assessment of what type of debt is 
morally acceptable. 
 
Defining the underlying problem as being poor decision making about credit use is 
problematic because it privileges certain types of purchases over others. There is also an 
intuitive solution to the problem, which is to limit access to “dumb”112 credit. In the 
context of preventing people who are living in poverty from accessing harmful consumer 
credit products, this is could lead to discouraging the use of, or restricting access to, 
credit where it is most needed.
113
 It may also lead to unintended consequences like 
financially excluding people who are living on low incomes from access to formal and 
regulated credit opportunities.
114
 
 
This paper will not focus on common characteristics of the over-indebted because 
correlation is not the same as causation and it is difficult to determine whether the 
characteristics cause over-indebtedness, or vice versa, or if they are both caused by some 
third element. 
 
This is not to say that consumers cannot make bad decisions, but that an attempt to use an 
objective framework to separate good decisions from bad decisions, or to pin over-
indebtedness on being caused by characteristics of individuals, is fraught. Subjectively 
bad decision making is very difficult issue to address at a systemic level because of its 
subjectivity.  
 
C Objectively Onerous Credit Terms Causing Over-indebtedness 
The objectively onerous terms of some consumer credit products, like interest rates, 
penalty fees, and account fees, can also be identified as a cause of over-indebtedness. 
Unscrupulous lenders make an easy target, and setting limits the terms of consumer credit 
products seems like a very clear and reasonable course of action. Targeting objectively 
onerous terms probably would reduce the over-indebtedness of vulnerable people, and the 
number of people caught in a ‘debt cycle’. 
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However, as with limiting access to certain types of credit, putting limits on the rates and 
fees charged by financial institutions could have an unintended consequence of excluding 
people from regulated, formal financial institutions.  
 
Credit terms can be objectively assessed, and can be easily and clearly regulated. This 
means that this is a cause of over-indebtedness that can be addressed systemically. 
However, objectively onerous credit terms are not the only cause of over-indebtedness, 
because the credit terms do not ask the question of why the over-indebted used the 
consumer credit products at all. 
 
D Poverty Causing Over-indebtedness 
Throughout this paper there has been an argument that access to some debt is good 
because it enables consumers to smooth consumption,
115
 alleviate poverty and 
temporarily distribute wealth to where it is most needed.
116
 Behind this argument there is 
an implicit acknowledgement that consumers do not consume evenly over time, that 
without access to consumer credit there are people who would lack the resources to 
tolerably manage their poverty, and that wealth does not always reside where it is needed. 
Without being explicitly called upon, one of the key reasons that people need credit at all 
is that they are living in poverty, with insufficient resources, and are able to borrow 
money to temporarily alleviate that poverty. This is not widely identified in literature as a 
problematic driver of over-indebtedness, which may because it is very obvious, or may be 
because it is a problem does not typically fit within the range of issues that can be 
meaningfully resolved by consumer credit law and regulation.  
 
However, poverty, or an objective lack of necessary resources, can explain why some 
people who are over-indebted use consumer credit products to an extent that the 
repayment of the debt becomes unmanageable. Poverty is also a systemic issue that can 
be objectively assessed, and steps can be taken within the framework of consumer law 
and regulation to mitigate the effects of over-indebtedness on consumers who are living 
in poverty. 
 
E Conclusion 
This part of the paper has outlined three of the main drivers for people becoming over-
indebted. Consumers are not all the same, and neither are over-indebted consumers. This 
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means that it is not possible to pinpoint one dominant cause of over-indebtedness, 
because every consumer will have been influenced by different causes of over-
indebtedness in different proportions. Some consumer credit decisions are subjectively 
bad decisions, some consumer credit terms are very reasonable, and some people are 
over-indebted for reasons other than poverty. However, the purpose of this paper is to 
isolate some of the contributing factors and consider how they can be managed in order to 
protect vulnerable consumers from becoming over-indebted. 
 
V Addressing Systemic Issues 
A Introduction 
This part of the paper outlines some suggestions for addressing the causes of vulnerable 
people becoming over-indebted. To address objectively onerous terms, there is a short 
discussion about low cost government loans, or government-subsidised consumer credit 
products, for vulnerable people to get out of over-indebtedness. To address vulnerable 
people who are over-indebted because they objectively lack sufficient resources, there is 
a discussion about options for government grants and consumer credit default options. 
 
B Addressing Objectively Onerous Credit Terms 
Objectively onerous credit terms have been identified as one of the drivers that can lead 
to people becoming over-indebted. There are two ways to approach this. The first way is 
to approach it by creating limits that explicitly target people who are vulnerable or are 
already, or are near to, over-indebtedness. This option is not explored further in this 
paper, because as discussed earlier in the paper, limiting the ability of vulnerable or over-
indebted people to manage their own poverty by consumption smoothing using consumer 
credit can be welfare reducing,
117
 or drive them to informal or unregulated markets.
118
 It 
also risks incentivising financial institutions to further exclude vulnerable people from 
mainstream financial participation as a reputational risk management strategy.
119
 The 
second option is for the state to alleviate the effect of onerous consumer credit terms on 
vulnerable people by subsidising financial institutions to offer non-onerous consumer 
credit terms, or to provide loans with non-onerous terms directly.   
 
To an extent, low cost government loans are available to some vulnerable credit 
consumers. Work and Income New Zealand (WINZ) is the operational government entity 
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that delivers social welfare payments to social welfare beneficiaries in New Zealand.
120
 
One of the services that WINZ offers is advance payment of a welfare benefit when 
welfare beneficiaries have an “immediate need for something essential”121 that can be 
repaid in instalments. This is effectively an interest free loan that is available several 
times a year, with increasing restrictions as use becomes more frequent. This availability 
captures people who are social welfare beneficiaries, effectively helping people that fit 
within a narrow definition of impact vulnerability combined with acting under the 
influence of pressure vulnerability. This type of low cost loan would be beneficial to 
people acting under the influence of most other types of vulnerability. 
 
An alternative to no or low interest loans would be to subsidise mainstream financial 
institutions to loan to people who met certain criteria for supply and/or pressure 
vulnerability, on non-onerous terms. This would have the potential to achieve economies 
of scale for high risk borrowers, and reduce the potential for vulnerable people to become 
over-indebted by the mechanics of interest and penalty fees. It would also limit the extent 
to which the government was taking on an additional role in the financial ecosystem and 
leave consumer credit administration to financial institutions that specialise in that type of 
service. However a subsidy regime could also create perverse incentives for financial 
institutions to take advantage of the subsidy regime by becoming artificially less risk 
tolerant to attract subsidy payments, or by coaching consumers to frame their credit 
requirements in terms of pressure vulnerability. Interfering with the market could also 
divorce consumers from the negative consequences of becoming high risk credit 
consumers, and encourage more consumption, higher debt burdens and more risky credit 
use behaviour.   
 
An issue with targeting objectively onerous credit terms is that it will not necessarily 
reduce the need that drives people to acquire progressively unaffordable debt. Making 
more affordable credit available would help people who are over-indebted because the 
interest and fees incurred are onerous. It would transfer the cost of their higher risk 
profile on to the government, and allow those people to get out of debt by focussing on 
the principal repayments, and then stay out of debt. However, for people who are over-
indebted because they systematically do not have enough money for the necessities of 
life, this would merely slow the speed at which the debt became overwhelming. 
  
120
 Work and Income “Our Structure” (13 October 2015) Work and Income 
<http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/about-work-and-income/our-structure.html> 
121
 Work and Income “Advance Payment of Benefit” (13 October 2015) Work and Income 
<http://www.workandincome.govt.nz/individuals/a-z-benefits/advance-payment-of-benefit.html> 
21 Protecting Vulnerable Consumers from Over-Indebtedness 
 
 
C Addressing Poverty 
Earlier in this paper, poverty and an objective lack of sufficient resources was identified 
as a reason why people become over-indebted. A way to address this is to create 
mechanisms that can give relief from debt. There are two ways to do this, either by 
directly giving people who are over-indebted the money needed to cancel the debt, or to 
have mechanisms for people to default on debt. 
 
Giving money directly to people who are living in poverty has been trialled in a global 
context. The data that has been collected about recipients of charity in the form of cash 
transfers, in Mexico, Kenya and India suggests that alleviating poverty with a cash grant 
has long term positive welfare effects on the recipients.
122
 Recipients in general did not 
spend the money frivolously, but instead on items like new roofs, new businesses,
123
 
healthcare and education.
124
  
 
In Kuwait, if citizens can go before the courts and show genuine financial difficulty, the 
courts can show leniency on their debt and the government pays the debt on the citizen’s 
behalf.
125
  The social, political and economic context of Kuwait is quite different to the 
context of New Zealand, particularly because in Kuwait there is a very large resident 
population of non-citizens, and there is a great deal of government revenue generated by 
oil.
126
 The culture of Kuwait is also heavily informed by the principles of Islam and 
Sharia law,
127
 under which an inability to pay debt is considered to be a serious moral 
issue and an admission that debt has become unmanageable is to admit moral failing.
128
    
 
The scale of poverty in the New Zealand context is quite different to that in a global poor 
context. Similarly, and attitudes toward debt in New Zealand are probably quite different 
to attitudes toward debt in Kuwait. This would mean that the outcomes could be less 
stellar, and the uptake of debt relief much higher. In New Zealand there are limited 
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circumstances in which social welfare beneficiaries can receive grants
129
 when they have 
urgent and necessary requirements and have no other way to meet these costs.
130
 This is 
again restricted to people who are social welfare beneficiaries. A useful avenue of further 
research would be to quantify the cost that over-indebtedness has on the economy, in 
terms of loss of capital in interest to foreign banks, unemployment and underemployment 
caused by debt issues, lost productivity due to mental health issues, and provision and 
administration of services that help people who are over-indebted and suffering from 
associated negative consequences. It would then be interesting to consider what impact 
that cost could have if spread over people who are over-indebted because they were 
experiencing vulnerability, particularly impact vulnerability, at the time that consumer 
credit decisions were made. 
 
A benefit of delivering cash grants to alleviate over-indebtedness is that the creditors 
would not lose money when borrowers are not able to pay their debts. A detriment is that 
it would separate vulnerable consumers from the consequences of their debt decisions, 
and it would separate financial institutions from the consequences of lending to high risk 
consumers. However, this could logically lead to lending terms becoming more 
favourable to consumers as pricing for risk would become less relevant. 
 
An alternative approach would be to have mechanisms for defaulting on debt, including 
bankruptcy, No Asset Procedures and Summary Instalment Orders.
131
 This is an option 
that is available in New Zealand,
132
 however bankruptcy is a very stressful experience, 
before which significant financial hardship is often experienced.
133
 It also often leads to 
creditors never recovering the debt,
134
 and to the person who has declared bankruptcy 
being pushed further away from financial inclusion and participation.
135
 This type of 
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default action does not, on the face of it, appear to address the welfare of the person who 
was over-indebted or an equitable result for the financial institution that sold them the 
consumer credit product. 
 
D Conclusion 
In this part of the paper there has been a short discussion of the ways that the problems 
that create over-indebtedness could be addressed. This part of the paper has argued that 
limiting the terms available to people who are vulnerable, or having bankruptcy-type 
solutions are not helpful to solving the problems because they either are likely to create 
new problems, particularly exacerbated financial exclusion for vulnerable people. 
Instead, this paper has argued that low cost government loans, government subsidised 
loans, or direct cash grants to vulnerable people who are over-indebted, are solutions that 
could be usefully researched further or reviewed through a more operational lens. 
 
VII Conclusion 
This paper has been a discussion about how to protect vulnerable consumers from over-
indebtedness. The first part of this paper focussed on how consumers can be vulnerable 
and why over-indebtedness is an issue that needs to be addressed.  
This was followed by outlining why it may be considered problematic to attempt to 
protect people from their own consumer credit decisions. The paper outlined arguments 
about whether access to consumer credit products is good for consumers, whether that 
conceptualising any consumer credit decision as harmful to the consumer does not fit 
with the free market conception of rational consumers, and how the way that the 
conversation is framed around vulnerable people tends to be very patronising toward 
them and discounts their financial experiences. In this part of the paper it was argued that 
these arguments are underlying tensions that are problematic some of the time, for some 
consumer credit decisions, and for some vulnerable credit consumers.  
 
This paper then discussed some of the causes of over-indebtedness for vulnerable people. 
These were a lack of self control and poor decision making, the imposition of objectively 
onerous credit terms on vulnerable people, and poverty as a driver for becoming over-
indebted. This paper then outlined some proposed ways that that the causes for over-
indebtedness could be addressed. This paper argued that providing government subsidies 
to facilitate low cost loans for consumers who are over-indebted due to vulnerability, or 
to provide cash grants to alleviate over-indebtedness and poverty, are ideas that should be 
researched further in the New Zealand context to determine whether they would work, 
and whether they are feasible to implement.  
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